The Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: a Trap for the Unwary? by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 4 Article 6
The Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and
Occupiers of Land: a Trap for the Unwary?
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: a Trap for the Unwary?, 36 Md. L. Rev. 816 (1977)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol36/iss4/6
Comments
THE COMMON LAW TORT LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND
OCCUPIERS OF LAND: A TRAP FOR THE UNWARY?
The tort liability of land occupiers to entrants injured on their property
is governed in the majority of American jurisdictions by common law rules
that were developed in nineteenth century case law. Depending upon the
circumstances surrounding the entrant's presence on another person's
property, he may be classified either as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.
Each of these categories prescribes a distinct standard of care for the
landowner that determines whether he has fulfilled his legal obligations.
This system has been significantly altered in many jurisdictions by the
creation of exceptions to the common law status classifications. Strict
adherence to the common law rules in other jurisdictions, including
Maryland, has produced harsh and inequitable decisions. Several states
recently have abolished the common law categories, substituting the general
negligence standard of reasonableness.' However, this new trend is not
without its critics. It has generated considerable controversy among many
state courts. This Comment will compare the merits of the negligence
standard with the invitee, licensee, and trespasser classifications. Simplified
judicial administration and jurisprudential considerations indicate that the
negligence standard is a preferable alternative in light of the weaknesses of
the common law system.
A PARADIGM OF THE JUDICIAL CONTROVERSY
A recent New York decision joining the trend of abolition, Basso v.
Miller,2 illustrates the scope of the judicial debate over the continuing value
of the invitee, licensee, and trespasser categories. Before Basso eliminated
the categories, a defendant's standard of care depended on the jury's
determination of the plaintiffs status as either an invitee, licensee, or
trespasser.' If the plaintiff was considered an invitee, the occupier was
obligated to exercise care sufficient to avoid any unnecessary exposure to
1. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968);
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537,.489 P.2d 308 (1971) (en banc); Pickard
v. Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631
(N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976);
Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). The District of
Columbia has also abolished the common law categories. Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
2. 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). Both defendants,
Miller and Ice Caves Mountain, Inc., appealed from verdicts against them. The court
of appeals affirmed Miller's liability in negligence, dismissing his affirmative defense
of Basso's contributory negligence because the issue had not been raised at trial. Id. at
242-43, 352 N.E.2d at 873, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 569.
3. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §27.1, at 1430 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
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danger.4 If the plaintiff was termed a licensee, the occupier had to refrain
from intentionally injuring the licensee and was required to warn of
concealed dangers that could not be reasonably discovered by the licensee
from an inspection of the premises. 5 Finally, if the plaintiff was classified a
trespasser, the occupier's only duty was to refrain from wilfully or wantonly
injuring the trespasser.6
Despite the seeming simplicity of the categories, the facts in Basso made
it difficult for the jury to identify the status of the plaintiff, for the exact
nature of Basso and Miller's presence at the resort was obscured by
conflicting testimony. The claim in Basso arose out of a motorcycle accident
that occurred on the property of a large scenic park and hiking resort, Ice
Caves Mountain. Upon learning that a small boy was trapped in a crevice at
the resort, Basso and Miller, who were local residents, travelled to the resort
on Miller's motorcycle to lend their aid. They gained admission to the resort,
persuaded the supervisor to let them stay, and eventually contributed to the
success of the rescue.7 As they were leaving the resort property, Miller's
motorcycle, on which Basso was a passenger, encountered a series of holes
in the road, and Basso was injured." Basso instituted a tort action, naming
Miller and Ice Caves Mountain, Inc. as defendants. At trial the resort
contended that their entrance had not been authorized. But even if Basso
and Miller were trespassers at the time of their entrance onto the resort, the
jury could have found that their status had shifted to that of licensees upon
the acquiescence of the proprietor in their presence, and to that of invitees
upon their aid to the rescue effort.9 Since the jury returned a general verdict
for Basso, it is impossible to determine which status had been assigned to
him. On appeal Ice Caves Mountain challenged the trial court's formulation
of the standard of care owed to licensees."'
Although the verdict against Ice Caves Mountain could have been
reversed on other grounds,'' the majority seized upon the difficulty in
determining Basso's status as an occasion to repudiate continued use of the
invitee, licensee, and trespasser categories.' 2 In a case where both the
permission for the plaintiff to be on the defendant's property and the nature
4. 40 N.Y.2d at 245, 352 N.E.2d at 875, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
5. Id. at 238-39, 352 N.E.2d at 870-71, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 566-67.
6. Id. at 244, 352 N.E.2d at 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 570.
7. Id. at 235-37, 352 N.E.2d at 869-70, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 565-66.
8. Id. at 236, 352 N.E.2d at 869, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 564-65.
9. Id. at 239-40, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
10. Id. at 239, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 566-67.
11. Id. at 249, 352 N.E.2d at 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 573. The trial court assigned too
great a standard of care to a land occupier with respect to licensees. The jury was
instructed that the occupier must inspect the premises and warn the licensee of
dangerous conditions. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
12. 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (1976). In
two cases decided on the same day, the New York State Court of Appeals applied the
negligence standard in two land occupier liability cases in which the plaintiffs would
have been trespassers under the common law system. In Barker v. Parnossa, Inc., 39
N.Y.2d 926, 352 N.E.2d 880, 386 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1976), the court of appeals reversed a
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of the plaintiffs presence on the property were contested, the common law
scheme becomes cumbersome, rigid, and often inequitable. Indeed, the jury
in Basso had sifted through a 1000 page record in order to assign a status to
the plaintiff. Furthermore, the scope of the common law categories was not
broad enough to allow the jury to consider the possibility that one or more
classifications could properly be applied to Basso depending upon the time
on which the inquiry focused.'" The court observed that applying these
categories to the facts of the case meant "that the duty owed to plaintiff on
exit may have been many times'greater than that owed him on his entrance,
though he and the premises all the while remained the same."' 4 This
anomaly of shifting status demonstrates the primacy of the landowner's
state of knowledge about the plaintiffs presence on his land in imposing
liability under the common law categories. For the activities of the plaintiff
and the condition of the defendant's premises did not become legally
relevant until this initial determination of knowledge had been made. Under
the negligence standard adopted by the court, however, the landowner's
knowledge is only one of many factors considered under the label
"foreseeability."' 5 As a test of the landowner's conduct, the court stated: "A
landowner must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property in a
reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the
likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, the burden of
avoiding the risk."16 For example, in Basso, the jury would presumably
consider such factors as the owner's past experience with rescue efforts, the
dangers inherent in this particular resort, and the feasibility of minimizing
these hazards.
Two broad policy grounds persuaded the New York court to abolish the
status classifications and adopt a fault standard as a measure of liability.
First, demographic changes were thought to have rendered the common law
categories obsolete.' 7 The court of appeals did not elaborate this reasoning,
though it did point out that the rigid categories could be traced to feudal
finding of no liability and granted a new trial to the administrator of the estate of a
twelve year old boy who fell to his death from a poorly maintained catwalk in the
interior of an abandoned coal silo while playing without permission on the
defendant's property. In Scurti v. New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387
N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976), the court of appeals reversed a judgment for the defendants and
granted a new trial to the administrator of the estate of a fourteen year old boy who
was electrocuted. Without any authorization, he had climbed atop a freight car in a
county railroad yard and touched a high voltage power supply wire.
13. See 40 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68. The
problem of identifying the category of a plaintiff when his status as an entrant may
vary over time is discussed briefly in Comment, Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of
Ordinary Care to All Entrants - "Invitee," "Licensee," and "Trespasser" Distinc-
tions Abolished, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 426, 430 (1969).
14. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
15. Id. at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.28 at 568.
16. Id., 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (quoting Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
17. Id. at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
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times, when land was the principal object of value. ' This view presumed
that the common law limitation on landowners' liability for injuries to
entrants was based on the theory that it would have been difficult for the
owner of a vast manorial estate to regulate incursions on distant portions of
his property.' 9 In contrast to that era of large property holdings, the past
two centuries of urbanization, industrialization, and population growth have
led to more crowded living conditions.21" Recognizing that the modern
occupant has a greater opportunity to supervise entrance upon smaller
pieces of property and that the frequency of incursions upon private
property increase as people live closer together, the court determined that an
owner's interest in the unrestricted use of his property must accommodate
the competing societal interests in preservation of human life.2'
The second reason for abolition was the desire to eliminate the
complexity and confusion of rules and nomenclature that had developed
under the common law system. 22 Strict application of the common law rules
proved to be impossible in light of modern social and economic relation-
ships;2 : consequently, many exceptions were created to mitigate harsh
results. Although the refinements produced salutary results in some cases,
they also created a "semantic morass" of confusion.24 These flaws in the
rationale and operation of the common law rules persuaded the Basso court
to discard the status categories and endorse a fault standard as the measure
of land occupier liability.
According to the Basso court, the negligence test would elevate the issue
of the likelihood of the plaintiff's presence on the defendant's property from
an implicit consideration in determining the plaintiff's status to a "primary
independent factor" in determining the defendant's, liability. 25 Although the
Basso opinion did not discuss extensively the differences between the
application of the common law rules and the use of a negligence standard in
land occupier liability cases, the court of appeals was more explicit in Scurti
18. Id., 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68.
19. Cf. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 57 (4th ed. 1971) (liabilities of landowners
related to degree of control over property and ability to prevent harm to others). See
also note 119 infra.
20. E. WRIGLEY, POPULATION AND HISTORY 224-34 (1969).
21. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
.568. The Basso court referred to one of the rationales given in Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561,568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968): "A man's life or limb
does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of
compensation under the law because he has come upon the land of another without
permission or with permission but without a business purpose." See also James, Tort
Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J.
612, 628 (1954) [hereinafter cited as James, Licensees and Invitees].
22. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567-
68.
23. Id. at 240-41, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
24. Id. at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567-68 (quoting Kermarec v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959)).
25. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d at 24i, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
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v. New York, 26 a case decided the same day. Under the common law
categories, once there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the
plaintiffs status, the court resolved the question of the defendant's standard
of care as a matter of law because the invitee, licensee, and trespasser
categories by definition imposed a particular standard of care on the
landowner.17 Thus, if status were not in controversy, the result would be
foreordained. In applying a negligence standard, the court must first decide
whether the evidence will support an inference of negligence or lack of
negligence by the defendant.2'8 Evidence previously regarded as conclusive
of status continues to be relevant to decision making under the negligence
rule but is not dispositive on the issue of liability. Typically, such evidence
includes proof of the circumstances of the plaintiffs entry onto the
defendant's premises, the accessibility and location of the defendant's
property, and the owner's knowledge of the entrant's presence. 29 But not
every case will raise a factual issue for the jury's consideration. Under the
common law categories, the jury evaluated whatever proof of injury was
offered in order to ascertain the plaintiffs status; with the application of a
negligence standard to landowner liability cases, however, a plaintiff must
introduce sufficient evidence to support a determination that the defendant
failed to exercise reasonable care. Nevertheless, once the plaintiff raises an
issue as to the defendant's negligence, the jury will exercise its judgment,
drawing upon community standards, to determine whether the defendant
has exercised the proper degree of care toward the plaintiff.30 The Basso
decision also indicated that the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk would operate in land occupier liability cases in the same
manner as in other negligence actions. 3
The concurring opinion of Chief Judge Breitel in Basso articulated the
opposite side of the controversy over abolition of the common law
26. 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976).
27. Id. at 439-41, 354 N.E.2d at 796-98, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 57-59.
28. Id. at 442, 354 N.E.2d at 798-99, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 59. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328B (1965); James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 672-74 (1949) [hereinafter cited as James, Functions of Judge
and Jury].
29. Scurti v. New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 442, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55,
59 (1976).
30. James, Functions of Judge and Jury, supra note 28, at 679-85.
31. 40 N.Y.2d at 241-42, 352 N.E.2d at 872-73, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Under a
negligence standard, contributory negligence is often theoretically quite different
from assumption of risk:
Assumption of risk involves the negation of defendant's duty; contributory
negligence is a defense to a breach of such duty. Assumption of risk may involve
perfectly reasonable conduct on plaintiffs part; contributory negligence never
does. Assumption of risk typically involves the voluntary or deliberate incurring
of known peril; contributory negligence frequently involves the inadvertent
failure to notice danger.
James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 698 (1953) (footnotes omitted).
Contra, Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEx. L. REV. 562, 563-69
(1942).
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classifications, arguing that abolition was both unwise and unnecessary to
the decision of the caseY2 Conceding that some defects existed in the old
standard, the concurring opinion contended that the common law system
was still viable and should be retained. According to Judge Breitel, the
status-based classifications adequately consider the foreseeability of injury
and reflect a proper allocation of risks and costs between landowner and
injured entrant.' Furthermore, he indicated that the exceptions to the status
rules, such as those for trespassing children and for -public employees, have
satisfactorily accommodated changing times and values.34 In addition to his
defense of the common law system, Judge Breitel raised two objections to
the adoption of the negligence standard. He warned that abolition would
create more problems than it would solve because a new set of rules would
have to be developed in order to apply the "amorphous" negligence
standard.35 Judge Breitel also criticized the leeway given to juries under the
new standard. He apparently feared that this latitude would allow the
reputed sympathy of jurors for plaintiffs to control the decision making. 36 In
32. 40 N.Y.2d at 243, 249, 352 N.E.2d at 873-74, 877-78, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 569, 573.
Judge Breitel supported the result, but not the reasoning, of the majority opinion. He
stated in his concurring opinion that he would have found reversible error and
granted a new trial only on the basis of the incorrect jury'instructions. Id. at 249, 352
N.E.2d at 877-78, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
33. 40 N.Y.2d at 246-47, 352 N.E.2d at 875-76, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.
34. Id. But see text accompanying notes 94 to 108 infra.
35. 40 N.Y.2d at 247-48, 352 N.E.2d at 876-77, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 572-73 (relying on
arguments presented in Payne, Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MOD. L. REV. 359, 362
(1958)). Payne's discussion of the administrative effects, of the substitution by the
English of the negligence standard for the common law categories of invitee and
licensee, Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, vwhich Judge Breitel uses as
a basis for his criticism of the adoption of a negligence standard by the majority in
Basso, is not analogous to the use of a negligence standard in land occupier liability
cases in the United States. In the United States the change to a negligence standard
involves only the expanded use of a judicially, not legislatively, created standard that
has been regularly applied for many years. The American abolition situation is
different in another respect. Although negligence terminology, such as "reasonable-
ness," is applied by juries using current community standards in the United States,
the English statutory language is applied by judges, since few English negligence
cases are tried by jury. Cf. Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(defending the propriety of leaving the issue of negligence to the jury); Marsh, The
History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 LAw Q.
REV. 182, 185-86 (1953) (noting the limited role of juries in negligence cases in
England at that time). If Payne is simply dealing with a problem of statutory
interpretation and application, cf. McDonald & Leigh, The Law of Occupiers' Liability
and the Need for Reform in Canada, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 55, 66 (1965) (discussing the
debate by the Law Reform Committee on the meaning of the statutory language
"common duty of care"); Odgers, Occupiers' Liability: A Further Comment, 1957
CAMB. L.J. 39, 41-42 (speculating about how courts will interpret the statutory
language "common duty of care"), then Breitel's fears are groundless. Cf. notes 191 to
195 and accompanying text infra (discussing the viability of the negligence standard).
36. 40 N.Y.2d at 248, 352 N.E.2d at 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 572. But see James,
Functions of Judge and Jury, supra note 28, at 680-85, which demonstrates that there
are several ways in which a judge can assure that the jury properly performs its
functions; notes 184 to 187 and accompanying text infra.
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addition, the new approach to land occupier liability cases would allow the
jury to formulate the proper standard of care. Judge Breitel objected to this
transfer of lawmaking function from the court to the jury on the grounds
that juries are incapable of formulating sensible and consistent rules of
law.:7 It is noteworthy, however, that in the trial court disposition of Basso
the jury returned a general verdict, making it impossible to ascertain which
of the common law categories had been applied. Another flaw in this
criticism is that it is not restricted to the landowner liability area; the logical
implication of this argument is that the negligence standard is inapprop-
riate in any case. The concurring opinion did not identify any characteris-
tics peculiar to land occupier liability cases that make a negligence standard
undesirable solely in that context.: Judge Breitel's failure to direct his
criticism of the negligence standard to the context of land occupier liability
weakens the force of his antiabolition argument in Basso; for this portion of
the concurring opinion does not advance his position other than to express a
general distrust of juries.
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Basso may be criticized
for their lack of specificity. The majority did not adequately address the
evidentiary and institutional implications of its decision to abolish the
common law categories. It is remarkable that to justify such a significant
change in the law, only general policy grounds were set forth and were not
subjected to searching analysis. Much of the concurring opinion is an attack
on the negligence standard rather than a specification of the reasons why
the common law system is still preferable. Perhaps these omissions may be
attributed to the relative novelty of the trend to discard the invitee, licensee,
and trespasser categories. Although Basso v. Miller highlights the issues
raised by abolition of the common law categories, it is necessary to examine
the current application of the common law rules before evaluating their
continued application.
CURRENT USE OF THE INVITEE, LICENSEE,
AND TRESPASSER CATEGORIES
The common law categories, which originated in English case law,:19
were first applied in the United States in 1865.4 ' Although still retained by
37. 40 N.Y.2d at 248, 352 N.E.2d at 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
38. Id. at 247-48, 352 N.E.2d at 876-77, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
39. See generally Robert Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358; Heaven v.
Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (first enunciating a standard of care); Indermaur v.
Dames, 14 L.T.R. (n.s.) 484 (C.P. 1866), aff'd in 16 L.T.R. (n.s.) 293 (Ex. 1867);
Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856). Nineteenth and early twentieth
century English case law establishing and applying the common law categories to
land occupier liability cases has been a frequent topic of study for commentators. See,
e.g., Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 YALE
L.J. 632, 649-63 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hughes, Duties to Trespassers]; Marsh,
supra note 35 at 182-99; Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV.
573, 576-84 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Business Visitors].
40. Sweeney v. Old Colony & Newport R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 368 (1865)
(railroad liable to plaintiff who was injured when hit by train as he was crossing
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most American jurisdictions, including Maryland, the common law invitee,
licensee, and trespasser classification system has encountered increasing
judicial criticism. 4' Application of these standards has so notoriously
favored land occupiers that their position has been described as one of
virtual immunity from prosecution. 42 The exceptions carved out from these
categories as a response to changing times are usually so numerous that the
classifications no longer function as rules of law that can be applied
consistently, uniformly, and predictably. 4 : The courts have also relied on
legal fictions and distinctions to mitigate harsh results. For instance, child
trespassers are treated as constructive invitees, 4 4 and courts distinguish
between active and passive negligence toward trespassers.45 These fictions
tracks after flagman signalled to him that it was safe to cross). For discussions of
recent application of the common law categories in the United States, see J.
O'MEARA, TORT LIABILITY OF ILLINOIS LAND OCCUPIERS (1968); 1 H. STEVENSON, LAW
OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE ATLANTIC STATES §§ 331-35 (1954) (invitees); id. at §§ 402-13
(licensees); 2 H. STEVENSON, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE ATLANTIC STATES §§ 414-82
(1954) (trespassers); H. STEVENSON, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE ATLANTIC STATES
201-19 (Supp. 1975).
41. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31
(1959); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99-101 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 114-17, 443 P.2d 561, 566-68, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
101-04 (1968); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller,
40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (1976);
Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, , 333 A.2d 127, 130-32 (1975). But
see Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, 97 Idaho 634, 550 P.2d 137 (1976).
The Idaho. Supreme Court recently rejected a request that it expand the use of the
common law categories to cover the standard of care that an easement owner owed to
the owner of the servient estate. The court's refusal was based on Harper and James'
argument that enlarged application in this type of case would only serve to stimulate
overzealous protection of property rights. Id. at 139 (citing HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 3, § 27.2, at 1434 (1956)). Harper and James indicated that there would be no
reason to decline application of the common law categories to determine the standard
of care owed by an easement holder, or even an invitee or licensee on the premises, to
a trespasser, since immunity in this case would reflect the unforeseeable presence of
the plaintiff. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.2, at 1433. The enigma of the
unforeseeable plaintiff has been enshrined in Palsgraf v. IOng Island R.R., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Cardozo, J.).
42. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976); F. BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 163 (1926); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.1, at
1430-31. See also Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 736-37 (1937);
Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV.
186, 187-89 (1957); Comment, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., and the Invitee-
Licensee-Trespasser Distinction, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 379-80 (1972); 25 VAND. L.
REV. 623, 624-26 (1972).
43. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976). But see, e.g.,
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104
(1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
45. See Scurti v. New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 441, 354 N.E.2d 794, 798, 387 N.Y.S.2d
55, 58.
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have been applied only sporadically, however, and do not form a coherent
framework capable of replacing the general categories.
4
6
Invitees
Persons who enter onto the property of another by express or implied
invitation for a purpose related to the -activities of the occupant are
invitees. 47 The standard.of care owed to an invitee is that of reasonable care
in the circumstances. 4 This obligation may entail inspection of property,
warnings, removal of dangerous conditions, or curtailment of dangerous
activities, depending on the facts of the particular case. 49 There are two
theories - economic benefit or invitation - that support the imposition of
liability for injury to an invitee. 5  The economic benefit theory of
classification regards entrance as a quid pro quo;51 because the occupier
receives some actual or potential pecuniary benefit, he assumes an
affirmative obligation to keep the premises reasonably safe for the entrant.
52
In application, some courts have strained to identify some mutual economic
benefit that would qualify the plaintiff as an invitee.5 3 The invitation theory,
on the other hand, includes the idea of economic benefit yet extends the
46. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68
(1976). Cf. James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63
YALE L.J. 144, 181-82 (1953) [hereinafter cited as James, Trespassers] (the fictions of
"invitation" and "permission," used to reclassify some trespassers and mitigate harsh
results, should be applied consistently).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). For an exhaustive
recitation of the various types of factual situations in which an entrant has been
labelled an invitee, see James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 612-27.
Among the classes of entrants held to be invitees are store customers, patients in a
doctor's office, deliverymen, and postmen. Id. at 614-18.
48. See generally HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.12, at 1487; § 27.13, at 1489-
95.
49. See James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 621-27; 25 VAND. L. REV.
623, 625-27 (1972). See also'RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS.§§ 341A, 343, 343B, 344
(1965).
50. See James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 612-23. See also Annot.,
95 A.L.R.2d 992 (1964).
51. For discussions of the difficulty in applying the quid pro quo concept, see
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal,
J., concurring); Comment, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., and the Invitee -
Licensee - Trespasser Distinction, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 380-83 (1972).
52. See generally HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.12, at 1478; James,
Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 612-15. See also Comment, The Outmoded
Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1957). New Jersey's
use of the economic benefit test is discussed in Note, Landowners' Liability in New
Jersey: The Limitations of Traditional Immunities, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 599, 611
(1958).
53. See, e.g., Weil v. Smith, 469 P.2d 428, 433-34 (Kan. 1970); Mercer v. Tremont &
Ga. Ry., 19 So. 2d 270, 275-76 (La. App. 1944) (entrant to shop office of railway
company who came with the purpose of soliciting advertising from the train company
held to be an invitee); Jamds, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 616-18 nn.73-
81.
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basis of responsibility to an implied representation by the occupier that the
premises will be reasonably safe for those whom he encourages to enter. 5
Application of the economic benefit or invitation tests may sometimes
overlap, leading to the same result,5 But a plaintiff may qualify as an
invitee in the absence of any economic benefit. The latter situation is
exemplified where the invitee is a visitor to a free public library or is a
patron at a public playground or swimming pool. 5s Although jurisdictions
differ as to which of the two tests is employed,5 7 the invitation theory is
more widely used at present.58
Maryland law defines an invitee, or "business visitor," in terms of the
economic benefit theory: an invitee is someone explicitly or implicitly invited
to come onto property for purposes related to the owner's business. 59 A
business visitor is owed ordinary care while he is on the portion of the
premises to which the invitation applies;60 he will not be denied compensa-
tion for injuries caused by a dangerous condition if he also exercises
ordinary care for his own safety.61 Maryland law, however, limits the scope
of the liability of land occupiers to injured business invitees. Although the
occupier must exercise reasonable care for the safety of an invitee, his
obligations are restricted to the area of the premises-for which the invitation
is given and to the time reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of
54. See generally HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.12, at 1479-80, 1484-87;
James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 612, 619-20.
55. See James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 614-15.
56. Id. at 617-18.
57. The original Restatement of Torts replaced the word "invitee" as used
judicially with the term "business visitor." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332 (1934). See
Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 574, 585. This modification excluded
many persons characterized as invitees under the invitation theory, such as a person
who enters a store only to have money changed or to use the telephone, or a person
who comes to meet a passenger at a train station, id. at 588-91, because invitee status
was defined solely in terms of the land occupier's pecuniary interest in the entrant's
presence. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332 (1934). The first Restatement rule was
criticized as not representative of the majority of court decisions concerning invitees,
Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 611, which often found an invitation to
exist where premises were open to the public, id. at 587-93, or where there was no
possibility of pecuniary benefit to the occupier. Id. at 594. In response, the second
edition of the Restatement of Torts added the view that an invitation constitutes an
express or implied representation by the land occupier that his property is safe for the
entrant. Id. at 612; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 & Comment b. (1965). The
Restatement now defines an invitee in terms of the invitation and the economic
benefit theories. Id. at § 332.
58. Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 611. For a survey of the use of the
economic benefit and invitation tests, see Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 992 (1964).
59. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 159-61,131 A.2d 470, 473-74
(1957); Glaze v. Benson, 205 Md. 26, 35, 106 A.2d 124, 129 (1954); Fitzgerald v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 712 n.2, 336 A.2d 795, 797 n.2
(1975).
60. Pellicot v. Keene, 181 Md. 135, 139, 28 A.2d 826, 828 (1942).
61. See, e.g., Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 223 Md. 235, 239, 164 A.2d 273, 276
(1960).
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the visit.62 If the invitee strays about the premises or remains for an
unreasonable amount of time, his status may change to that of a licensee or
even a trespasser. 63 Because liability in Maryland is limited by the economic
benefit test, certain plaintiffs may not qualify as deserving reasonable care
who, under the invitation theory or the negligence standard, would
otherwise be afforded that protection.
Licensees
Licensees may be present on the property of another for a variety of
reasons: under express or implied permission,6 4 pursuant to a private
conditional privilege, or as of right.65 The standard of care owed to licensees
by landowners is usually described in one of two ways: in jurisdictions
following the Restatement position, the occupier need not inspect the
premises to discover dangers or warn the licensee of conditions or activities
known or discoverable by the licensee;66 or, in jurisdictions that apply the
status categories more strictly, the occupant must refrain from wilfully or
wantonly injuring the licensee.67 Thus the degree of responsibility of a
landowner in a given situation depends upon whether the licensee was
injured by a dangerous condition maintained by the occupier on his land or
62. See, e.g., Pellicot v. Keene, 181 Md. 135, 139, 28 A.2d 826, 828 (1942).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965) (Comment on Subsection (3)1);
see, e.g., Ortiz v. Greyhound Corp., 175 F. Supp. 14, 20 (D. Md. 1959) (applying
Maryland law); Macke Laundry Service Co. v. Weber, 267 Md. 426, 432, 298 A.2d 27,
30-31 (1972) (general statement of Maryland law in dicta). See also Barnes v. Housing
Auth., 231 Md. 147, 152, 189 A.2d 100, 102 (1963) (three year old boy invitee strayed off
walkway at apartment complex and fell into a well; directed verdict for defendants
affirmed); Pellicot v. Keene, 181 Md. 135, 139, 28 A.2d 826, 828 (1942) (six year old
invitee went behind store counter and fell through trap door; judgment for plaintiff
reversed; no implied invitation to plaintiff for area behind counter). But see Crown
Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 157-58, 131 A.2d 470, 472-73 (1957) (invitation
found to extend impliedly to area where plaintiff was told to wait and where he was
subsequently injured); Comment, Implied Invitation, 18 MD. L. REV. 338 (1958). See
also Levine v. Miller, 218 Md. 74, 79, 145 A.2d 418, 421 (1958) (appellant invitee left
area of invitation, but returned six hours later and was injured; directed verdict for
defendants affirmed; plaintiff's status changed to that of a licensee, or possibly a
trespasser).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965); HARPER & JAMES, supra note
3, § 27.8, at 1470. Examples of different types of visitors whose presence may be
permitted by the owner are social guests, unsolicited salesmen, and loiterers at a train
station. Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 573, 589.
65. See Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter
of Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REv. 407, 431-36
(1966).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341, 342 (1965). See also Myszkiewicz
v. Lord Baltimore Filling Stations, Inc., 168 Md. 642, 647-48, 178 A. 856, 858 (1935)
(the presence of a bare licensee may require that the occupier give notice of new and
abnormal conditions which increase the danger to the licensee); HARPER & JAMES,
supra note 3, § 27.9, at 1471-72, 1474-78.
67. See, e.g., Peregoy v. Western Md. Ry., 202 Md. 203, 207, 95 A.2d 867, 869 (1953).
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by an activity conducted by the occupier.68 Occupiers will be liable to
licensees for injuries caused by dangerous conditions only if the occupier
knew of the condition and could not reasonably expect the licensee to
discover it. 6 9 For example, the occupant must protect the licensee from a
natural condition that constitutes a concealed trap. 7 In addition, occupiers
will generally be liable to licensees for failure to exercise reasonable care in
conducting an activity that injures a licensee, 71 if the licensee did not realize
the danger and had no reason to know that it existed.
72
There is some controversy over the classification of public employees
and social guests as licensees.7 3 Policemen and firemen traditionally have
been classified as licensees, 74 based on the negative rationale that since they
enter onto unforeseeable areas of property and arrive at unforeseeable times,
the land occupier could not have sufficient knowledge of the likelihood of
their presence to be held to exercise reasonable care for their safety.
7 5
However, some courts and commentators argue that the importance of the
services rendered by policemen and firemen merit the higher degree of
protection given to an invitee.7 6 Courts also differ on whether social guests
68. See James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 606-10. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341, 342, 345 (Comment d) (1965); HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 3, §§ 27.9, 27.10, at 1471-76; 25 VAND. L. REV. 623, 625-26 (1972).
69. See, e.g., HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.8, at 1472.
70. See, e.g., id. § 27.9, at 1474.
71. See, e.g., id. §27.10, at 1476.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341 (1965).
73. Maryland has encountered difficulty in classifying public employees. For
instance, one student commentator has suggested that Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237
Md. 242, 206 A.2d 148 (1965), dealing with landowner liability to injured firemen,
could be interpreted as holding either that firemen were invitees or that they were
licensees entitled to greater care than bare licensees. See Note, Firemen: Licensees or
Invitees? Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 25 MD. L. REV. 348, 350-52 (1965).
74. See, e.g., James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 634-35. See
generally Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter of
Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1966).
75. See generally HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.14, at 1501-05. See also
James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 634-38 (public employees classified
as licensees) and 633-34 (public employees classified as invitees). But cf. Note,
Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter of Right or Under
a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REV. 407, 408 (1966) (where premises
open to the public, or where a commercial or industrial owner must exercise
reasonable care for the safety of his own employees, the imposition of a reasonable
care standard should not increase the owner's cost in making his property safe). The
difficulty in classifying public employees who respond to emergencies is discussed in
Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 697-703, 297 N.E.2d 43, 46-49 (1973), and in
Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 608-09. Some courts have had trouble
categorizing public employees with routine jobs and ordinary working hours. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (difficulty in
classifying a health official inspecting the defendant landowner's business premises
was one factor that contributed to decision to abolish all common law categories for
entrants).
76. See Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 700 n.1, 701-03, 297 N.E.2d 43, 47 n.1,
48-50 (1973). See also Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 608-09; Note,
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should be classified as invitees or licensees.7 7 Some courts have classified
social guests as invitees.78 Generally, unless the occupier has made special
representations about the safety of the premises, social guests are considered
licensees. Classifying guests as licensees places them on the same footing as
members of the occupant's family, even though a guest may perform
services for the occupant or confer some benefit by his presence.7 9
Nevertheless, the absence of a special obligation on the host to care for the
safety of a social guest may not reflect reasonable community expectations,
especially when this duty is compared with the standard of care owed to a
business visitor.80
Maryland has bifurcated the common law category of licensees. First,
there are social guests, called "licensees by invitation";8' the host must
observe the same standard of care toward these persons that he would
Firemen: Licensees or Invitees? Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 25 MD. L. REv. 348, 350 (1965);
18 How. L.J. 220, 226 (1973). Bohlen would have agreed with this position. Cf. Bohlen,
The Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their Own Right
(pt. 2), 69 U. PA. L. REv. 237, 250-51 (1921) (policemen and firemen should be treated
as "licensees by acquiescence," requiring occupiers to notify them of new and
concealed dangers on land). While not reclassifying the plaintiffs as invitees, some
jurisdictions have required that an owner exercise reasonable care for the safety of
persons performing, although not for pay, as firemen. See, e.g., Zuercher v. Northern
Jobbing Co., 66 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1954) (volunteer fireman injured).
77. See, e.g., Stevens v. Dovre, 248 Md. 15, 18, 234 A.2d 596, 598-99 (1967).
Although social guests have been labelled licensees, see HARPER & JAMES, supra note
3, §27.11, at 1476-78; James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 611-12;
Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note 39, at 604-05, some courts have been
dissatisfied with this classification. The first case to break with the traditional
classification of social guests was Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 328-29, 102
N.E.2d 453, 463 (1951), which held that a host must exercise ordinary care to avoid
injuring his guest by any of his activities; the host must also warn the guest of any
conditions which the host should reasonably know to be dangerous where there is
little likelihood that the guest will discover the condition and protect himself against
harm. However, the care owed to social guests as a special category of entrants in
Ohio was very similar to that owed to licensees. See id. at 324, 328-30, 102 N.E.2d at
460, 463. Later, some courts chose to abolish the common law categories in cases
dealing with social guests on the rationale that the common law distinctions between
entrants were unrealistic and obscured inquiry into all the circumstances of injury
that had a bearing on whether the risk of harm to the guest was reasonable. See
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 563-66, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-
102; Alexander v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730, 731-
33 (La. App. 1957).
78. See Genesee Merchants Bank and Trust Co. v. Payne, 381 Mich. 234, 248, 161
N.W.2d 17, 24 (1968) (Kelly, J., concurring); Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 143 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. App. 1962).
79. See, e.g., cases cited at note 82 infra. See generally HARPER & JAMES supra
note 3, §27.11, at 1477; James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 611-12.
Placing a guest on the same level as the host's family has the ironic consequence of
decreasing his remedies.
80. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
81. Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 483, 237 A.2d 434, 438 (1968).
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exercise for the safety of himself and his family. 2 Second, there are "bare"
licensees; the occupier's sole duty toward those persons is to refrain from
wilfully or wantonly injuring them," the same standard of care owed to
trespassers. The Maryland rule for bare licensees is illogical because it does
not recognize the difference in circumstances between the licensee, who
enters with permission of the occupant, and the trespasser, whose presence
on the property of another is entirely unlawful.14 Maryland applies the
Restatement rule for liability to licensees for injuries from dangerous
conditions in the context of the host/guest relationship. 5 Although no
Maryland cases have dealt with injuries to a social guest whose presence
was unknown to the host, it is likely that the host would not be held liable in
those circumstances.8 " One reason for this social guest rule is that it would
be unreasonable to require a host to provide more care for social guests than
for his own family, for the social guest usually receives hospitality and other
gratuitous benefits from his host.87 Another possible reason is the fear of
82. See, e.g., Stevens v. Dovre, 248 Md. 15,18, 234 A.2d 596, 598-99 (1967); Paquin
v. McGinnis, 246 Md. 569, 572, 229 A.2d 86, 88 (1967); Kight v. Bowman, 25 Md. App.
225, 230 n.3, 333 A.2d 346, 350 n.3 (1975).
The degree of care that the host would have exercised if the guest had not
been present is a question for the jury. Thus, procedurally the operation of the
standard of care required with regard to a social guest resembles a negligence rule. A
Maryland host would probably be held liable to a guest where the host had created
and knew of unreasonable risks of harm which the guests could not reasonably
discover, where the host failed to warn a guest of an unreasonable risk of harm, or
neglected to keep the premises reasonably safe when the guest had no reason to know
of a dangerous condition. Cf. Stevens v. Dovre, 248 Md. 15, 18, 234 A.2d 596, 598-99
(1967) (host not liable for injuries to guest who fell down steps because there was no
defect or peculiarity in construction of the steps that created a hidden danger). In its
standard of liability toward social guests, Maryland follows the Restatement rule. See
Paquin v. McGinnis, 246 Md. 569, 572, 229 A.2d 86, 88 (1967).
83. The owner need not anticipate the licensee's presence nor keep the premises
safe for him. Duff v. United States, 171 F.2d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying
Maryland law). See also Telak v. Maszczenskj, 248 Md. 476, 483, 237 A.2d 434, 438
(1968); Fitzgerald v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 712-13, 336
A.2d 795, 798 (1975). A recent case in another jurisdiction dealt with an uninvited
social guest in the same manner as a bare licensee is treated in Maryland. Wood v.
Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973). One commentator, however, has noted the
English view that the bare licensee formula is "barbaric" because humanitarian
concerns dictate the exercise of greater care toward someone who has permission to
enter property than a mere abstention from the intentional infliction of harm. Bohlen,
Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 739-40 (1937).
84. Compare Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 483, 237 A.2d 434, 438 (1968) with
Fitzgerald v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 712-13, 336 A.2d'795,
797-98 (1975) (application of the willful and wanton test to trespasser).
85. Paquin v. McGinnis, 246 Md. 569, 572, 229 A.2d 86, 88 (1967) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 342 (1965)); Stevens v. Dovre, 248 Md. 15, 18, 234
A.2d 596, 598-99 (1967).
86. See Kight v. Bowman, 25 Md. App. 225, 230-31 n.3, 333 A.2d 346, 350 n.3
(1975).
87. Paquin v. McGinnis, 246 Md. 569, 573-74, 229 A.2d 86, 89 (1967). But see id. at
572-73, 229 A.2d at 88, for a summary of the minority rule that hosts are required to
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collusion between a host and his guests. Despite these justifications for
restricting liability to social guests, the resulting disparity between the
social guest rule and the treatment of business visitors is incongruous. If the
visitor comes to another person's home to transact his business, he attains
invitee status, on the theory that the home has become a place of business
for the time of the transaction. 8  In operation, the rule for liability of hosts
for injuries sustained by their social guests appears to be an inverse
formulation. of the economic benefit test that governs care to invitees. Since
social guests receive. a gratuitous benefit of hospitality, they apparently
have no warrant to claim special consideration from their host. Business
invitees confer benefits, however, so they deserve the higher standard of
care. The standard of care for "licensees by invitation" approximates the
evaluation of various -factors that would occur under a negligence test,
except that the question of pecuniary benefit dictates the appropriate degree
of care to guests.
Thus, adoption by the Maryland courts of a single test that would apply
to all visitors who are invited, in the ordinary sense of the word, would
involve only some modifications of the current standard of care owed to
lawful entrants. This would be a desirable change for several reasons. First,
a uniform rule would eliminate semantic anomalies such as the notion that
social guests are "invited" in the ordinary sense of the word but not in a
legal sense.89 Second, a broader rule would consider rewards other than
pecuniary benefit that an -entrant is capable of bestowing on the land
occupier. Finally, if the broader rule were based on negligence theory, the
factor of permission, which has become irrelevant to the standard of care
towards a bare licensee, would be included in the evaluation of land occupier
liability.
Trespassers
Trespassers enter onto land without the express or implied permission of
the occupant. 90 Consistent with the preeminence of property interests
take more active steps to protect the safety of their guests because a guest does not
have an intimate knowledge of the physical characteristics of the home and because
the homeowner can easily protect against loss from injuries to guests by carrying
liability insurance.
88. Paquin v. M cGinnis, 246 Md. 569, 573, 229 A.2d 86, 88-89 (1967).
89. This is the essence of the frequent comment that a social guest is an invitee
who is not an invitee. See, e.g., HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.11, at 1477; James,
Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 611; Prosser, Business Visitors, supra note
39, at 585. The RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) .OF TORTS § 332, Comment a (1965) addresses
this issue:
"Invitee" is a word of art, with a special meaning in the law. This meaning is
more limited than that of "invitation" in the popular sense, and not all of those
who are invited~ to'enter upon land are invitees. A social guest may be cordially
invited, and strongly urged to come, but he is not an invitee.
90. See generally HARPER &.JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.3, at 1435; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §329 (1965); James, Trespassers, supra note 46, at 144-46.
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implicit in the common law scheme, the occupier has no affirmative duty to
see that his premises are safe for a trespasser.91 A trespasser cannot demand
that the occupier provide him safety when his presence is improper. 92
Moreover, the trespasser's presence is.:not foreseeable since the occupier
never gave permission to enter.93 Nevertheless, the occupier must refrain
from wilfully or wantonly injuring the trespasser.94
Several exceptions to the trespasser rule result in the reclassification of
an entrant without permission as a licensee: when the'occupier knows of the
trespasser's presence; 95 when the occupier maintains an artificial condition
on his property that trespassers who repeatedly travel across a confined
area may not reasonably discover and which is. likely to harm the
entrants;96 and when the occupier conducts an-activity on his property that
91. See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note' 39, at 635, 690; James,
Trespassers, supra note 46, at 144-45.
The traditional standard of care toward trespassers allows the land occupier
to be negligent. He need only refrain from intentionally-harming or' entrapping the
trespasser. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.3, at 1440-42; James, Trespassers,
supra note 46, at 144-45. Keeton analyzes the trespasser status as a situation where
the defendant's liability has been restricted purely for policy-reasona, even though he
may have been negligent:
The lack of a duty in such instances does not mean and shbuild not mean that the
defendant has acted prudently. It simply means that even though he was guilty of
anti-social conduct and conduct that should be discouraged, the achievement of
other socially desirable ends or objectives [e.g., unfettered enjoyment of property
interests] that will be hindered by shifting the loss from the defendant to the
plaintiff is a weightier consideration.
Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting From Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA.
L. REV. 629, 632 (1952).
92. For discussions of the morality of a trespasser' sconduct, see, e.g., Gould v.
DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 829 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder
v. Landowner: Basis of Responsibility in Tort, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 495 (1923); James,
Trespassers, supra note 46, at 152.
93. But see James, Trespassers, supra note 46, at 150-51, where James argues
that the presence of a trespasser is often foreseeable in fact.
94. The distinction between the active conduct of the land occupier and dangerous
conditions maintained on his property exerts fundameital influence on the question
of liability to trespassers. The Restatemeit- embraces .this distinction. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 333-39 (1965).' See generally, Eldredge, Tort
Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEMPLE L.Q. 32 (1937); James, Trespassers, supra note 46,
at 148-51, 154-56.
For recent application of the willful and wanton test in Maryland, see, e.g.,
Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 314, 272 A.2d 21, 22-(19711y Popma v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 254 Md. 232, 234, 254 A.2d 351, 352 (1969); Herring v. Christensen,
252 Md. 240, 241, 249 A.2d 718, 719 (1969); Fitzgerald v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 713, 336 A.2d 795, 797-98 (1975).
95. See Herrick v. Wixom, 121 Mich. 3 84, 80 N.W. 117 (1899); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 336, 337, 338 (1965). But see Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers,
27 HARv. L. REV. 403 (1914) (discussing the Massachusetts rule, which does not hold
the occupier to a higher standard of care if the presence of the. trespasser is known).
96. See Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460 136 A.2d 887, 892-93 (1957);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 335 (1965).
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is highly dangerous to constant trespassers. 97 In these situations the
occupier must exercise reasonable care to avoid injuring the trespasser.
Trespassing children constitute another exception to the usual standard of
care. This exception reflects a belief that the reasons for applying a lesser
standard of care to trespassers do not apply to trespassing children.
Children may not appreciate certain risks of harm and the occupier cannot
reasonably expect them to protect themselves. 9 Further, the important
social interest in protecting the welfare of children outweighs the greater
burdens on land occupiers from a higher standard of care. 99 One expression
of this exception has been the attractive nuisance doctrine,10 0 which treats
children as constructive invitees. Under the attractive nuisance doctrine, the
97. See Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 43-44, 86 A.2d 777,
779 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 334 (1965).
98. See HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.5, at 1455-56.
99. Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 691; see James, Trespassers,
supra note 46, at 163.
100. The attractive nuisance doctrine developed as a reaction to a nineteenth
century Supreme Court case, Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873), in
which a six year old trespasser recovered for injuries sustained while playing on an
unguarded turntable in an unfenced yard. See generally Luck v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
510 F.2d 663, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Stout the Supreme Court did not base its
decision on the boy's status as a trespasser. Instead, the Court enunciated a broader
rule of liability:
[Ilf from the evidence given it might justly be inferred by the jury that the
defendant, in the construction, location, management, or condition of its machine
had omitted that care and attention to prevent the occurrence of accidents which
prudent and careful men ordinarily bestow, the jury was at liberty to find for the
plaintiff.
Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 661 (1873). Other courts sought to reach
the same result as Stout by analogizing to cases where baited traps were set by a
landowner to kill roaming dogs; turntables and similar objects were labelled
"attractive nuisances," which called for the land occupier to exercise reasonable care
toward a child trespasser. James, Trespassers, supra note 46, at 162-63; Prosser,
Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 430-31 (1959). The Supreme Court
compared the attraction of some dangerous objects to children with baiting a hook to
catch fish. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268, 275 (1922). The theory
behind requiring the exercise of reasonable care toward a child trespasser in these
circumstances was that the interesting object impliedly invited'the child to come onto
the occupant's land. James, Trespassers, supra note 46, at 162-63. An alternate
explanation offered for the attractive nuisance theory was that it represented a policy
decision that society would benefit if landowners were encouraged to prevent injuries
to small children. See Eastburn v. Levin, 113 F.2d 176, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
The Supreme Court later narrowed its application of the attractive nuisance
doctrine by requiring that the child know of the dangerous object or condition upon
entering the defendant's property. See United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S.
268 (1922). The concept of "allurement" - that the trespasser was induced to enter the
land because he was attracted by an object on the land - has largely disappeared.
See James, Trespassers, supra note 46, at 163 & n.7, 164; Prosser, Trespassing
Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 431-32 (1959). In Best v. District of Columbia, 291
U.S. 411, 419 (1934), the Supreme Court cited United Zinc with approval, but its
decision centered on the attractiveness of a wharf to playing children rather than the
children's knowledge of a particular danger present on the wharf. The Best decision
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child trespasser must show: that he was injured by a dangerous object, such
as a turntable,' 10 or a dangerous condition, such as a pond, 10 2 on the
defendant's land; that he did not realize the risk of harm created by the
object or condition; and that it was likely that children would play with the
object, or be curious about the condition, if they trespassed on the
defendant's land. 0 3 The many circumstances in which trespassers receive
special treatment indicate that a reasonableness standard is being applied.
Although the widespread use of these doctrines may have mitigated harsh
results, it has also undermined the substance of the original trespasser
classification.10
Maryland, however, has made no exceptions to its trespasser rule for
over seventy years. 0 5 Maryland recognizes neither the rule that raises the
has been interpreted as overruling United Zinc. See Eastburn v. Levin, 113 F.2d 176,
177 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The Restatement (Second) of Torts formulates a negligence theory
that resembles the attractive nuisance doctrine, balancing the interests of the
occupant and child to raise the standard of care toward trespassing children when the
occupier maintains a highly dangerous artificial condition on his premises. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torrs § 339 (1965).
101. See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
102. See, e.g., United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922) (here, the
"pond" was a water-filled cellar in an abandoned factory).
103. Under the Restatement (Second) rule, occupiers may be liable to trespassing
children for injuries caused by highly dangerous artificial conditions if:
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor
knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know
and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death
or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area
made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility of the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden
of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children
involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or
otherwise to protect the children.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 339 (1965). See generally HARPER & JAMES, supra
note 3, §27.5, at 1451-56; Note, Trespassing Children: A Study in Expanding
Liability, 20 VAND. L. REV. 139, 154-61 (1966). Although the Restatement suggests
that in some circumstances landowners may be liable for injuries sustained by
trespassing children, state courts continue to apply strictly the common law rule. See,
e.g., Brewer v. Annett, 86 Ney. 700, 475 P.2d 607 (1970) (summary judgment for
defendants where child burned on live coals from fire after the owners of property did
not warn the child's father of the danger).
104. See discussions of mitigating doctrines in HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3,
§ 27.7, at 1467-70; Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 685, 702;
Comment, Abolition of the Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees Entitles Ali
Lawful Visitors to a Standard of Reasonable Care - Mounsey v. Ellard, 8 SuFFOLK L
REV. 795, 808 (1975). However, the dissent in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 635
(N.H. 1976), argued that the mitigating exceptions should be retained because it took
many years to fashion them.
105. Since Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182, 28 A. 1065 (1894), every trespasser
case in Maryland has been tried according to the same legal standard. A recent
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standard of care owed toward known trespassers 10 6 nor the attractive
nuisance doctrine. 10 7 Although Maryland courts therefore may not be
criticized for the doctrinal impurity that exists in the jurisdictions that apply
numerous mitigating doctrines, they have failed to remedy the harshness of
their strict application of the trespasser rule. 108
TREND TOWARD ABOLITION OF THE COMMON Law
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN THE
UNITED STATES
Total Abolition
To date, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, New
York, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island have completely abrogated the
traditional classifications governing liability of landowners to invitees,
licensees, and trespassers, replacing them with the general negligence test of
reasonableness in the circumstances.10 9 The leading case in the abolitionist
example is Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 522, 287 A.2d 265, 268 (1972). Other
recent cases provide an illustration of the great hardship that strict application of the
trespasser category may inflict. See, e.g., Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 272 A.2d 21
(1971) (judgment for defendant where four year old child drowned in neighbor's
swimming pool which was left filled with water for the new residents who were to
move into the house); Herring v. Christensen, 252 Md. 240, 249 A.2d 718 (1969)
(judgment for defendant where an unsupervised trash fire that landowners had
maintained on unfenced property burned a three year old boy).
106. See, e.g., Hicks v. Hitaffer, 256 Md. 659, 668, 261 A.2d 769, 773 (1970);
Fitzgerald v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 713, 336 A.2d 795,
798 (1975).
107. See, e.g., Hensley v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 258 Md. 397, 411, 265 A.2d 897,
905 (1970); Mondshour v. Moore, 256 Md. 617, 619-20, 261 A.2d 482, 483 (1970);
Herring v. Christensen, 252 Md. 240, 241, 249 A.2d 718, 719 (1969); Fitzgerald v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 714-15, 336 A-.2d 795, 798 (1975).
108. Recent Maryland cases are collected in note 105 supra. The attitude of the
Maryland courts was exemplified in Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 317, 272 A.2d
21, 23 (1971), which expressed continuing support for the statement of Chief Judge
McSherry in Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 319-20, 37 A. 266, 266 (1897):
This is a case of exceedingly great hardship, and we have diligently, but in
vain, sought for some tenable ground upon which the appellants could be relieved
from. . loss .... But hard cases... almost always make bad law; and hence it
is ... far better that the established rules of law should be strictly applied, even
though in particular instances serious loss may be thereby inflicted on some
individuals, than that by subtle distinctions invented and resorted to solely to
escape such consequences, long settled and firmly fixed doctrines should be
shaken, questioned, confused or doubted.
109. Abrogation of the common law rules has occurred in a variety of factual
situations. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (health
inspector slipped on greasy metal stairs while examining restaurant kitchen);
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (social guest
injured when cracked faucet broke in his hands); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971) (policeman injured when he stepped into an
unmarked hole left by construction company on private property adjacent to public
alley); Pickard v. Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969) (person fell through hole
in floor in unlighted public restroom in courthouse); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d
[VOL. 36
LIABILITY OF OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS
trend, Rowland v. Christian,1" 0 formulated the negligence test in the
following manner:
[W]hether in the management of his property he has acted as a
reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and,
although the plaintiffs status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in
the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the
question of liability, the status is not determinative."'
Several reasons have been advanced to justify abolition: the difficulty in
working with the numerous exceptions to the common law rules, the
anachronistic views of the preeminence of property interests on which the
rules are based, and the harshness of treatment of litigants when the
common law rules are applied." 2
Defects in the Common Law System
The abolitionist decisions advance two major criticisms of the common
law categories. First, they observe that the numerous exceptions to the
categories have increased the complexity of the rules and have fostered
confusion in their application." 3 The various modifications of the common
law categories that have been fashioned to mitigate harsh results have
undermined the uniform application of the invitee, licensee, and trespasser
classifications. Reliance on the common law rules has therefore become
increasingly difficult:
In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban society, with its
complex economic and individual relationships, modern... courts have
... create[d] subclassifications among the traditional common-law
categories . . . . Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications
631 (N.H. 1976) (ten year old burned by unsupervised fire); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d
233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 396 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976) (adults allegedly came onto defendant's
property to participate in rescue effort of accident victim and were injured when their
motorcycle encountered hazardous road conditions on defendant's property); Mario-
renzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975) (five year old trespasser
drowned in water filled hole on defendant's property).
110. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). Rowland has been the
subject of numerous student comments and notes. See, e.g., Comment, Occupier of
Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to all Entrants - "Invitee," "Licensee," and
"Trespasser" Distinctions Abolished, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426 (1969).
111. 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
112. Many commentators endorse the abolitionist position. See, e.g., Hughes,
Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 633, 693-700; Marsh, supra note 35, at 182-83;
Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV.
186 (1957); Comment, California Applies Negligence Principles in Determining
Liability of a Land Occupier, 9 SANTA CLARA LAw 179 (1968); Comment, Loss of the
Land Occupier's Preferred Position - Abrogation of the Common Law Classifications
of Trespasser, Invitee, Licensee, 13 ST. Louis L.J. 444 (1969).
113. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632-33 (N.H. 1976); Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102-03 (1968).
Semantic disputes over the use of the common law rules have been noted. See note 114
and accompanying text infra.
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and subclassifications ... have produced confusion and conflict. As
new distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become obscured.
Through this semantic morass the common law has moved. . . towards
"imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in
all the circumstances." 14
This theoretical refinement of the common law categories may not even
correspond to the actual behavior of occupiers of land and entrants on their
property, for people seldom regulate their behavior according to subtle legal
distinctions.115
Second, abolitionist decisions have been justified by the argument that
the common law system, rooted in the feudal notions that land was of
primary importance and that the landowner could not be expected to guard
against encroachers, is no longer appropriate to the values and experience of
a more crowded, industrialized, and urbanized society. 116 In addition to
being unreliable gauges of the behavior of modern land occupiers and
entrants, the common law classifications do not reflect the current belief
that a land occupier's unrestricted freedom in the use of his property must
yield to the protection of personal safety. 117 The common law rules that
result in virtual immunity for land occupiers in some jurisdictions have been
criticized because they do not permit consideration of important factors that
should determine liability, such as prevention of human injury and the
availability of insurance." 8
The argument that contemporary conditions no longer supply any
rational basis for the status rules is not particularly persuasive. Abolitionist
decisions that contrast modern urban, industrialized conditions with those
existing in feudal times have taken liberties with history." 9 This reasoning
114. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31
(1959) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kermerac v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
245 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1957) (Clark, C.J., dissenting)) (refusal to extend the
common law categories to cover an admiralty case in which the plaintiff was injured
while visiting a crew member on a ship docked in New York harbor).
115. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
104 (1968).
116. See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386
N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (1976).
117. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A:2d 631, 632, 634 (N.H. 1976).
118. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 103 (1968). See also Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 689, 693,
where the author makes similar observations though in regard to trespassers. Cf. Mile
High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 474 P.2d 796, 798 (Colo. App. 1970), aff'd, 175 Colo. 537,
541-43, 489 P.2d 308, 312-13 (1971) (the court noted that recovery by the plaintiff
under the common law rules is often a matter of chance).
119. Probably the most reliable assessments of the historical roots of the common
law status classification system appear in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959) and Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
113, 443 P.2d 561, 564-65, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1968). In Rowland, the court referred
to "the dominance and prestige of the landowning class in England during the
formative period of the rules governing the possessor's liability." "Feudalism" is
recognized only as a historical precursor to English land holding systems in the
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fails to recognize that current rural or suburban environments may more
closely resemble the general physical characteristics of property holdings
under the manorial system than property use in crowded urban settings.
Since the historical justification for abolition relies in part upon this
misconception, the historical rationale offers a policy basis narrower than
the sphere to which the negligence rule applies the negligence rule applies
to all modern physical environments - urban, suburban, and rural - yet
the historical rationale advanced for application of the negligence rule may
be valid only with respect to modern urban property holdings. Furthermore,
the abolitionist opinions never identified the precise characteristics of
modem society, other than crowded living conditions in urban areas, that
render the common law rules anachronistic. Instead, the critics of the
common law categories have invoked several rather vague sources of social
policy: "modern social mores and humanitarian values,12 0 "industrialized
urban society, with its complex economic and individual relationships,"121 or -
modem "accepted values and common experience."' 122
The other rationale for rejection of the common law categories
concentrates on the results of application of the rules. Courts have noted
that the procrustean application of the invitee, licensee, and trespasser
categories has created harsh results.123 Inequitable verdicts have sometimes
been attributed to the imposition on the jury of the artificial status
categories as decision-making standards; if juries were to apply current
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 69 Cal. 2d at 113, 443 P.2d at 564-65, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 101. Some courts have been careless in their references to past systems of
landholding, such as manorial estates. This type of land tenure system flourished
principally in the tenth through twelfth centuries. See generally M. KEEN, THE
PELICAN HIsTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 47-60 (1969). Some of the vague references to
"feudal" types of landholding in the case law might be historically accurate if the
adjective were intended to describe manorial estates. But courts who use the term
"feudal" seldom specify the type of estate in land to which they refer, so it is
impossible to ascertain whether the discussions of past systems of landholding that
appear in some opinions are well grounded. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70
Wis. 2d 836, 854, 236 N.W.2d 1, 14 (1975). One court associated manorial estates with
eighteenth and nineteenth century England. Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C.
Cir. 1964). This is an inaccurate statement. By the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, English society, economics, and landholding systems had changed so
vastly that the large property holdings that remained in the hands of the nobility or
wealthy entrepreneurs bore little resemblance to the manorial system of prior
centuries. See G. RUDf, REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE 1783-1815, at 23 (1966).
120. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 104 (1968).
121. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959).
122. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
123. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 542, 489 P.2d 308, 312 (1971);
Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976).
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community values, verdicts might be fairer.1 2 4 The nature of the inequitable
results is particularly apparent in the context of the innocent child
trespasser, where it seems unfair and unreasonable to permit his status to
bar recovery for an injury resulting from an unreasonably dangerous
activity or condition on a landowner's property. 125 Classification of social
guests as licensees also exemplifies the unfairness litigants encounter in
application of the common law rules.'2 6
Recently, the common. law system also has been. criticized because it
does not provide an equitable allocation of costs and risks of injury. 27
Although the status approach antedated the use of the negligence concept, 28
the former now appears anachronistic in the field of tort law; other types of
tortious conduct have been analyzed under fault standards for many
years. 29 In his concurring opinion in Basso, Chief Judge Breitel conceded
that legal principles under the status classifications have not kept up with
changes in societal perceptions of the landowner-entrant relationship. 30 The
fault basis of tort law is gradually shifting toward a theory of enterprise
liability, with the goal of spreading costs of injury over larger portions of
society and, when possible through insurance, reducing the financial impact
of accidental injury.'" It has been suggested that application of the common
124. Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1972); See Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364
A.2d 631, 634-35 (N.H. 1976).
125. See note 105 supra.
126. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 249, 352 N.E.2d 868, 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,
573 (1976).
127. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir.
1972). But see id. at 108 (Judge Leventhal argued in his concurring opinion that the
common law system does provide an equitable allocation of costs for injuries to third
persons on residential premises, specifically excluding commercial property). The
debate between Leventhal and the majority of the court on this and other issues is
considered in Comment, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc. and the Invitee -
Licensee - Trespasser Distinction, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 378 (1972).
128. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 245, 352 N.E.2d 868, 875, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,
571 (1976); F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS 163 (1926); Hughes, Duties to
Trespassers, supra note 39, at 694. For a discussion of the origins of the negligence
concept, see W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 28, at 139-40 (4th ed. 1971).
129. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111-12, 443 P.2d.5.61, 563-64,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1968) (discussion of common law categories in relation to
§ 1714 of the California Civil Code). See also HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.1, at
1432.
130. 40 N.Y.2d 233, 248, 352 N.E.2d 868,.877, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 573 (1976).
131. See Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127, 134 (1976)
(citing Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir: 1972)). One
commentator has suggested that when considered in comparison with the contempo-
raneous development of the law of products liability, the Rowland decision may be a
stepping stone to a rule of strict liability for injuries to entrants caused by defective
conditions on business premises. See Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business
Premises - One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 820
(1975).
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law standards precluded explicit consideration of cost spreading or efficient
allocation of societal resources.
1 12
Application of the negligence standard would not impose undue burdens
upon land occupiers because they would only be responsible for the
precautions that were reasonably necessary in the circumstances of a
specific case."33 Obligations of care would not be decided solely on the
selection of a corresponding status label; instead, the legal standard of
conduct would be shaped in. light of the likelihood of the plaintiff's presence
in the context of a particular case.
34
Effects of Change to Negligence Standard
Adoption of a negligence standard should produce more equitable
results through the operation of the foreseeability test. One court emphas-
ized that under a negligence rule, the key factor to be considered will be
whether the visitor's presence was reasonably to be anticipated. 135
Additional relevant factors include
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved. 36
Legal analysis under the negligence standard would involve consideration
of all the circumstances behind the plaintiffs presence, rather than just a
limited aspect of the relevant events.
132. Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 691, 700-01.
133. Some skepticism has been expressed regarding the ability of residential
occupants to absorb costs of injury on their property. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,
Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring). See Ouellette v.
Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 636 (N.H. 1976) (dissenting opinion). But see Cooper v.
Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[flinancial hardship should be no excuse
for failing to take those measures which are within a defendant's capacity").
134. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 241, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 568
(1976).
.... 135.: Mariorenzi-v.,Joseph:DiPonte,-Inc:, 114 R.I. 294, -, 333 A:2d 127, 133 (1975).:
New Hampshire also emphasized foreseeability, yet included as a primary factor the
nature of the activity carried on by the defendant on his property. Ouellette v.
Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 635 (N.H. 1976).
136. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 100 (1968); accord, Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir.
1972). Rowland has proved to be the model for judicial application of the negligence
standard to land occupier liability cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,
Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294,
-, 333 A.2d 127, 131 (1975). Pickard v. Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969), is
an important decision because it applied the negligence standard independent of any
statutory constraints such as those that existed in Rowland. See 25 VAND. L. REV.
623, 632 (1972).
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The negligence standard tends to simplify the law of land occupier
liability by eliminating the exceptions and mitigating doctrines created and
applied under the common law system. A negligence standard would have
particularly desirable effects for different types of plaintiffs. The new rule
would mean that landowners could no longer be assured of a relatively high
degree of legal protection for their negligent acts toward trespassers.
1: 7
Juries would also be allowed to consider possible differences in motives and
circumstances when entrants are present on land without the express or
implied permission of the occupant, eliminating the need to mitigate the
irrational results that flow from identical treatment of child and adult
trespassers.1 :8 For lawful entrants on property, recovery under a negligence
standard will not depend upon the existence of a financial relationship
between the parties because the economic benefit test will no longer be
used. 1:' 9 This change would also benefit persons who would otherwise be
licensees by curtailing stress on permission, tied to the protection of the
property owner's exclusive possession, and by concentrating on the
likelihood of the presence of the entrant. 14 ° The different focus of the
negligence test would therefore terminate the sharp differentiation in
treatment of social and business guests. Furthermore, liability to public
employees such as firemen and policemen would be evaluated according to
the foreseeability of their presence; the negligence test would allow
consideration of issues of cost spreading, predicated on a recognition of the
benefits received from emergency municipal services.
14
'
137. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
138. See, e.g., Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (footnote omitted):
[T]he concept of trespass . . . casts its net very widely indeed .... There are,
obviously, trespassers and trespassers. The poacher upon the manorial estate of
18th Century England - that figure about whom revolved so much of the
developing law of landowners' liabilities to unauthorized visitors - defies
indentification with the child in this case, albeit a common legal label has been
affixed to them.
Maryland law on this point is discussed at notes 105 to 108 and accompanying text
supra.
The danger of application of legal fictions to mitigate harsh results to
trespassers is examined in James, Trespassers, supra note 46, at 180-82. He argues
that the decisive factor in most cases is the likelihood of the plaintiff's presence, an
inquiry that suggests a negligence standard. Id. If fictions had been employed
consistently, not sporadically, however, they might have become new rules of law.
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, § 27.7, at 1469.
139. See Comment, The Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 20
Mo. L. REV. 186, 192 (1957). Cf. Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634-35 (N.H.
1976) (comparing traditional treatment of a magazine salesman and a friend of the
landowner who are injured on a landowner's property).
140. Cf. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 3, §27.8, at 1471 (wider application of
foreseeability in land occupier liability decisions has influenced licensee cases, so that
the standard of care corresponds more to that owed to known or constant trespassers);
James, Licensees and Invitees, supra note 21, at 605-06 (permission is increasingly in
disfavor as a basis for liability in personal injury).
141. See Note, Landowner's Negligence Liability to Persons Entering as a Matter
of Right or Under a Privilege of Private Necessity, 19 VAND. L. REV. 407, 425 (1966)
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Possible Parallel Development in the Field of Tort Liability of Landlords
Another aspect of abolition of judicially fashioned standards and
introduction of a negligence test for landowners is the parallel development
in landlord tort liability. Landlords have traditionally enjoyed an almost
absolute immunity from tort liability for injuries attributable to defective
conditions on leased property. 4 2 Liability has been imposed only where
injury resulted from hidden dangers which the tenant could not be
reasonably expected to discover and which were known to the landlord,
where injuries resulted from defects or dangerous conditions on premises
leased for use by the public, and where injuries were sustained on premises
negligently repaired by the landlord. 43 Otherwise, the extent of a landlord's
liability is commensurate with the degree of control retained over portions of
the leased premises.14 4 Application of the control test, however, often
amounts to a rule of caveat lessee. 14
New Hampshire, refusing to create further exceptions, repudiated the
control test and replaced it with a negligence standard in Sargent v. Ross.146
The rationale given in Sargent for abolition of the control test parallels to a
remarkable degree the reasons presented in cases abrogating entrant status.
First, the current concern for human safety can no longer tolerate such tort
immunity. 4 7 Second, the historical basis for landlord immunity is no longer
persuasive. 148 At common law, the landlord was under no obligation to care
for the leased premises because he could not re-enter the property until the
lease expired.14 9 The Sargent court also noted that it had previously ruled in
favor of implied warranties of habitability, nullifying the rule of caveat
emptor.150 Traditional criteria of liability in New Hampshire - control of
the premises, common or public use, and hidden defects - which formerly
had to be established before the question of the landlord's negligence would
even be addressed, were retained in Sargent as factors to be considered
(injured public employees, especially firemen, should be compensated from public
funds).
142. See, e.g., Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, 84 U. PA. L REv.
467 (1936); Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MxcH. L. REv. 260 (1927); Quinn
& Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past With
Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Note, Lessor's Duty to
Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1949).
143. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 392, 308 A.2d 528, 531 (1973).
144. See 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 647, 650 (1974).
145. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396-98, 308 A.2d 528, 533-34 (1973).
146. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973) (four year old girl killed in fall from
negligently maintained outdoor stairway on common area of landlord's property). See
Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict
Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 19, 112-19; 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 647 (1974).
147. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 396, 308 A.2d 528, 533.
148. Id.
149. See 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 212, 215 (1974).
150. 113 N.H. at 396-98, 308 A.2d at 533-34 (referring to Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H.
87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971), which held that a lease includes an implied warranty of
habitability).
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under the negligence standard, but only insofar as they were relevant to the
issues of foreseeability and reasonableness of risks of harm.151 At least one
commentator has suggested that other courts may implement the negligence
standard for tort liability of landlords as a more desirable alternative than
creating further exceptions to the control test.152 On the whole, abolition of
landlord immunity for injuries to tenants or third persons may be viewed as
part of a general erosion of the favored position enjoyed by land occupiers
with regard to liability for injuries sustained on their property.15 3
Partial Abolition
Several jurisdictions - Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, and Wisconsin - have abandoned the invitee/licensee distinction and
eliminated these categories completely, yet have refused to discard the
trespasser classification.' 5' Rationales for abrogation of only the invitee and
licensee categories closely resemble those given for complete abolition of the
common law categories 5 5 but relate more specifically to problems in
differentiating between invitees and licensees. The partial abolition
decisions commented on the highly technical and arbitrary nature of the
status categories, 56 the inequities that arise when similar factual situations
151. 113 N.H. at 398, 308 A.2d at 534.
152. Love, supra note 146, at 117; 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 218, 224 (1974).
153. See Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 397-98, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973); Love,
supra note 146, at 118-20.
154. Connecticut abolished the licensee/invitee distinction by statute. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (West Supp. 1977), which reads in pertinent part: "The standard
of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the standard of care owed to a
business invitee." Unlike the cases in which the common law categories were
completely abolished, the partial abolition decisions all involved situations in which
the plaintiffs -would traditionally have been classified as licensees. Alexander v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1957) (woman
tripped on carpet while guest of son-in-law); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297
N.E.2d 43 (1973) (policeman fell on accumulation of ice as he was leaving defendant's
house after delivering summons); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639
(1972) (eleven year old guest of daughter of owner of cabin asphyxiated by carbon
monoxide released from gas refrigerator); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836,
236 N.W.2d 1 (1975) (friend of the family slipped on icy back porch when he came to
pick up the defendant's daughter).
Florida has expanded the land occupier's obligation of reasonable care by
treating licensees who are expressly or implicitly invited onto property as invitees.
The categories of uninvited licensee and trespasser are still used. Wood v. Camp, 284
So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973). It is also interesting to note that although never expressly
set forth as a rule, Montana courts may be working with only two categories of
entrants on land, invitees and noninvitees. See Comment, Liability for Personal
Injuries Caused by Use and Occupation of Real Estate, 30 MONT. L. REV. 153 (1969).
In operation this structure may accomplish the goal of formal partial abolition, but
the categories that Montana has combined are those of licensee and trespasser. Id. at
154.
155. See text accompanying notes 113, 116 & 123 supra.
156. Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730,
732-33 (La. App. 1957); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 166-67, 199 N.W.2d 639,
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result in inconsistent decisions, 7 and the societal interests in personal
welfare. 15,1
One reason for retention of the trespasser category was a perception
that considerations governing the care owed trespassers may be fundamen-
tally different from those establishing some degree of protection for lawful
entrants.'-, As a corollary to the "fundamental difference" argument, some
courts characterize the differences between classes of trespassers as
miniscule when compared with the disparities between individual invitees
and licensees.'"! This proposition overlooks the variety of possible circum-
stances in which a trespasser may enter upon land.'"
Notions of judicial restraint motivated the retention of the trespasser
classification by some courts. Several decisions refused to consider the
merits of the trespasser status in the abstract, choosing to defer the question
until a case actually involved a trespasser.1'62 Conditions for decision
making would then be optimal because the issues would be fully briefed and
643 (1972); see Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 697, 703-06, 297 N.E.2d 43, 46, 49, 51
(1973).
157. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 168-69, 199 N.W.2d 639, 644 (1972). See 25
VAND. L. REV. 623, 639 (1972).
158. Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 854-55, 236 N.W.2d 1, 10 (1975)
(analogizing to other types of law geared toward preventing injury to persons and to
society at large, such as zoning and environmental law).
159. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164-65, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972);
Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 843-45, 236 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1975). See
Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707 n.7, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 n.7 (1973). But see
Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 717-18, 297 N.E.2d 43, 57 (1973) (Kaplan, J.,
concurring); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976): "Our own cases
... indicate the correctness of Justice Kaplan's concurring opinion and that to retain
trespassers as a separate category will continue the difficulties inherent in separating
licensees from trespassers and 'good trespassers' from 'bad trespassers.'"
160. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707 n.7, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 n.7
(1973).
161. See, e.g., Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 709-12, 308 N.E.2d
467, 475-77 (1974); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976). Cf. Gould v.
DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (incongruity in similar legal treatment of
poacher upon manorial estate and the two year old boy who fell out of a window in the
case at bar). It is also interesting to examine the identical treatment of "innocent"
and criminally motivated trespassers. Compare Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182, 28
A. 1065 (1894) (child trespasser with motives of theft) with Herring v. Christensen, 252
Md. 240, 249 A.2d 718 (1969) (innocent three year old child trespasser burned by
unsupervised trash fire, on unfenced premises).
162. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972);
Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 843-45, 236 N.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1975). The
dissenting opinion by Judge Grimes in the most recent abolition case, Ouellette v.
Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 635-37 (N.H. 1976), expressed a willingness to follow
Wisconsin and Minnesota in retaining the trespasser classification, if a case with
issues involving trespassers were fully briefed and argued. Of all the complete
abolition decisions, only Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127
(1975) actually involved a trespasser. Judge Grimes argued that the trespasser
distinction can properly be abolished only in a case involving a trespasser. Therefore,
in his view, Mariorenzi is the only solid precedent for abolition of the trespasser
category. Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 635-36 (N.H. 1976).
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argued. One court based its refusal to examine the trespasser classification
in part on the ground that a criminal statute dealing with liability to
trespassers existed in the jurisdiction.' :1
Those partial abolition decisions that have been predicated on the
existence of a fundamental difference between lawful and unlawful entrants
on property apparently did not realize that these differences in circumstan-
ces would be considered under a negligence standard. Where judicial
restraint influenced the refusal to abolish the trespasser category, courts
have soundly exercised their discretion to preserve the integrity of their
decision making. It is quite possible that when cases calling for application
of the traditional trespasser classification arise, these courts will extend
their appreciation of the significant improvements - enhancement of
fairness to litigants, improved manageability of the law in its application,
and clarification of legal standards - that adoption of the negligence
standard can achieve." 4
JUDICIAL CONTROVERSY CONCERNING ABOLITION
OF THE COMMON LAW CATEGORIES
Many courts that have refused to discard the traditional status-based
system explicitly or implicitly concede that the overwhelming difficulties in
assigning a plaintiff to a particular category will eventually compel
abolition, 16- so that change will only be a matter of time. Once the decision
to abandon the common law standards has been made, judges must decide
how and when to modify the common law rules.
. Opposing views on how and when to abolish the common law categories
reflect philosophical differences about the judicial function in the legal
process. In determining the manner in which the common law classifica-
tions may be abrogated, courts have displayed a concern for preserving the
integrity of decision-making processes, maintaining respect for the judi-
163. Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 164-65, 199 N.W.2d 639, 642 (1972). The
dissent in Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 637 (N.H. 1976), also noted the
existence of a statute defining landowner liability to trespassers. The majority
opinion did not consider this to be a controlling consideration; they refused to extend
the criminal statute to govern a civil case.
164. In Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975) and in
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972), the courts did not refuse to
abolish the trespasser category. They merely deferred consideration of the question
until presented with a case that properly raised the trespasser issue. Accord, Cooper v.
Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal and Sobeloff, JJ.,
concurring).
165. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 717-18, 297 N.E.2d 43, 57-58
(1973) (Kaplan, J., concurring); Cunningham v. Hayes, 463 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Mo. 1971).
Cf. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973) (noting that the growth of
population in the United States has been accompanied by increased crowding in
living conditions, so that personal safety must be expressly considered in land
occupier liability cases); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 22 N.J. 454, 463, 126
A.2d 313, 317 (1956) (immunities have rightly been yielding to competing interests in
personal safety).
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ciary, avoiding harmful strain on court procedures and inequitable effects
on litigants, and ensuring the viability of standards of law in application.
The issue of when precedent should be overruled has been widely
debated by judges and commentators. 6 6 Proponents of the continued use of
the common law classes have usually adopted a conservative outlook toward
the constraints of precedent, 167 while decisions abolishing the invitee,
licensee, and trespasser categories have endorsed a more liberal view of
stare decisis. 168 The conservative view prefers a gradual evolution of the law
through strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis; 169 this method
preserves the stability of the law, ensures predictable application of the law
through respect for precedent, 70 and minimizes any chances of egregious
legal or policy errors as a result of hasty, comprehensive change.171
Adherents to this philosophy believe that sweeping changes in the law are
properly the province of the legislature. 172 However, some judicial critics of
166. See, e.g., Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 119
(1924); Catlett, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis And The Extent To
Which It Should Be Applied, 21 WASH. L. REV. 158, 162-67 (1946); Radin, The Trail of
the Calf, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 137, 141-57 (1946). See also B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES
OF LEGAL SCIENCE 70-72 (1928); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
142-45, 149-52 (1921); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 565-638 (tent. ed.
1958); Symposium, The Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REV.
203, 207-355 (1940).
167. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 118, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 105 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 637
(N.H. 1976) (dissenting opinion); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d.233, 246-47, 352 N.E.2d
868, 875-76, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 571-72 (1976) (concurring opinion).
168. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120-21, 443 P.2d 561, 566-68,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 102-04 (1968); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976);
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68
(1976).
169. See Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 248, 352 N.E.2d 868, 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564,
573 (1976) (concurring opinion). See also Payne, supra note 35, at 373:
A legal system must, in the nature of things, create and impose its own
comparatively rigid categories on the phenomena it seeks to control, and the
seemingly arbitrary operation of them in borderline cases is the price one has to
pay for some degree of legal certainty and for the exclusion of bias in the judicial
process.
The conservative approach has been criticized as mechanical jurisprudence. Hughes
calls such trust in the "definitive efficacy of legal rules" to resolve or prevent disputes
"pathetic." Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 703. Payne responded to
this criticism by saying that all the cases in which the common law system seems
inequitable are borderline cases. Payne, supra note 35, at 373-74. He insisted that the
rules should be judged in their ordinary application. Id.
170. See Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 522, 287 A.2d 265, 268 (1972); Hicks v.
Hitaffer, 256 Md. 659, 671, 261 A.2d 769, 771 (1971); Fitzgerald v. Montgomery County
Bd. of Educ., 25 Md. App. 709, 715, 336 A.2d 795, 799 (1975). See also Basso v. Miller,
40 N.Y.2d 233, 247, 352 N.E.2d 868, 876, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 569 (1976) (concurring
opinion).
171. Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 243, 352 N.E.2d 868, 874, 876-77, 386 N.Y.S.2d
564, 569, 572-73 (1976) (concurring opinion).
172. See, e.g., Osterman v. Peters, 260 Md. 313, 318, 272 A.2d 21, 24 (1971) (citing
Demuth v. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 315, 37 A. 266, 266 (1897) (McSherry, C.J.)
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more rapid and broader change have acknowledged that the policy bases of
the status and negligence theories are the same since both rules consider the
purpose for entrance upon property, the prevention of future harm, and the
moral blame attached to' the defendant's conduct. 173 It is doubtful, therefore,
that extensive and rapid change in this area is likely to be accompanied by
fundamental policy errors. In addition, fundamental alterations in tort law
are hardly unprecedented.! 74.,
The more liberal approAch, onithe oih6hand, favors the overruling of
precedent when the reason for the rule no longer exists or when application
of the rule is no longer feasible.' 75 If compelling reasons for change are
evident and if the legislature has not yet acted to revise the law, liberal
courts generally assume a more activist role and bieak with precedent.176
The common law rules may no longer merit enforcement as rules of law.' 77
First, the difficulty in applying the status distinctions and the logically
inconsistent results in similar factual situations indicate that the categories
Hicks v. Hitaffer, 256 Md. 659, 671, 261 A.2d 769, 774 (1970); Herring v. Christensen,
252 Md. 240, 241,42, 249 A.2d 718, 719.(1969). See also Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte,
Inc., 114 RI. 294,._, 333 A.2d 127, 134-35 (1975) (Joslin, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Basso v. Miller,.40 N.Y,2d 233,.247,352 N.E.2d 868, 876, 386 N.Y.S.2d
564, 572 (1976) (concurring opinion). . I
174. A certain degree of parallel development, though more rapid, has occurred in
the field of products liability, which has evolved past the use of negligence theory to
strict liability. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). See generally 1 B.
HURSH & H. BAILEYj AMEiCAN. LAW OF, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 2D §2:1, at 143-44
(1974). Compare Wintetbb'ttom v. Wright, i.0 Mees &. W. 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402
(1842) (privity of contract riquirementi with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
/ 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (19i6) (privity of cointraLct requirement abolished for negligence
actions based on injury ftm defectively manufactured products) and Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.. 358, 161 A.2d- 69 '(1960) (strict liability of maker or
seller of defective product for injuries, breach of implied warranty of fitness). See also
Ursin, supra note 131, where one aspect of commercial land occupancy is analogized
to strict liability for injuries-due to defective products..
Another example is the recent alterati6o of defamation law in Maryland. In
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 81o (1976) and Jacron Sales Co.
v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976), the Maryland Court of Appeals discarded
the common law rules of defamation and adopted a fault. standard, relying on the
Supreme Court decision in Gertz V. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). These
developments are' analyzed in .Note, The. Maryland Court of Appeals: State
Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Ro66i-t Welch, Inc., 36 MD. L. REV. 622 (1977).
175. See, eg., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 101-03, 105 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 543-46, 489 P.2d 308, 312-
13 (1971); Ouellette'v. Blanchard,'364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976); Basso v. Miller, 40
N.Y.2d 233, 240, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (1976); Mariorenzi
v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, -, 333 A.2d 127, 130-33 (1975); Sargent v. Ross,
113 N.H. 388, 398, 308 A.2d 528, 534-35 (1973). Some abolitionist decisions indicate
that a conservative approach was tried first,.but when the results were unsatisfactory,
a broad overruling of precedent was the only other reasonable alternative. See, e.g.,
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113-20, 443 P.2d 561, 564-69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
100-05 (1968)
176. See cases collected in note 167 supra.
177. See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers supra note 39, at 686.
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do not promote the stability and predictability of law that the conservative
viewpoint prizes. 178 Second, strict application of the common law rules no
longer reflects societal values, for. the prevailing view is that a landowner
should accommodate the competing interests in. human safety when
deciding how to use his property. 179 Third, the operation of the three
categories may produce arbitrary and harsh results that are inconsistent
with the role of courts in promoting fairness and working justice between
parties to litigation. 180
When replacing an old rule of law, it is important to consider whether
the substituted rule will be susceptible to abuse in its application and
whether the litigants will be treated at'least as fairly as under the former
standard. 181 Although juries may be particularly suited to decision making
under a negligence standard bec.use reference to contemporary community
values is indispensable to a determination of the ,proper degree of care owed
by a defendant, 82 they have also been viewe with skepticism and
distrust.' 3 Adoption of the negligence standard may favor plaintiffs
178. See also 25 VAND, L. REv..623, 635 & n.80 (1972). But pf. Rowland v. Christian,
69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569,.70 Cal. Rptr. 97,105 (1968) (dissenting opinion)
(statement that stability and predictability of law are important).
179. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian 69 Cal. 2d .108, 116-18, 44$ P.2d 561, 567-68,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1968).
180. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 632 (N.H. 1976) (noting the'
harsh results from application of the'.comm9n law categories).
181. This seems to be the essence of Breitel's concerns about- the -negligence
standard in Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233,243, 352 N.E.2d 868, 873-74, 386 N.Y.S.2d
564, 569 (1976). Cf. Payne, supra note 35, at 374 (the abolitionist approach ignores the
continuing necessity for rules as a check on judicial discretion).
182. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 98 (1881). Cf. Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d
653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (jury members should'be given wide latitude in exercising
their common sense); James, Functions of Judge and Jury, supra note 28, at 685(noting disagreement among commentators over juries' abilities to perform their fact-
finding role).
183. See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 40 NX.2d 233, 248, 352 N.E.2d 868, 877, 386 N.Y.S.2d
564, 572 (1976) (Breitel, C.J, concurring). 'One commentator took a conciliatory
approach to the question:
Until comparatively recently it Was thought'. . that courts had no power to find
facts, but now it is universally recognized that courts not only may but often must
make findings of fact .... There seems, therefore, no reason why it should not be
recognized that the function which the jury, exercises in defining standards of
conduct is that of declaring the standard by which the consequence of some
particular act or omission is to be determined. Whatever else this is, it is not that
of finding the existence of any fact or facts, and is not a law-declaratory function
as the term is 'ordinarily used. It is something between the two, necessary to the
proper administration of the pre-existing broadly stated law by making it capable
of application to the facts of specific litigated cases .
Bohlen, supra note 166, at 115. But see Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 636-37(N.H. 1976) (dissenting opinion), where it is urged that'the necessary result of
abolitionist decisions will be the complete withdrawal of the court from its traditional
role. Elimination of judicial guidelines in setting rules of law would diminish the
court's ability to control abuses and would open the way to ad, hoc decision making.
Compare Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 197.6) with Hughes,. Duties to
Trespassers, supra note 39, at 700.
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because juries, which are thought to favor plaintiffs, will have an expanded
role in decision-making processes. Advocates of the negligence standard
might challenge their critics, however, by pointing out that it was similarly
possible for judges to apply the common law categories sympathetically to
plaintiffs by artful phrasing of jury instructions. Under the status
classifications, the judge determined the elements necessary to categorize a
plaintiff; the only role of the jury beyond its usual fact-finding task was to
determine the classification to which the plaintiff properly belonged based
on the evidence presented in the case. 184 In contrast, under a negligence
standard, the jury determines what constitutes the proper standard of care
according to what was reasonable in the circumstances.
Assuming that' juries favor plaintiffs, there is evidence that this
propensity may not be an unbridled force. Judges still play an important
role under the negligence standard in limiting the possibilities of jury
mischief. Directed verdicts, for instance, can effectively block jury action. 185
Judicial implementation of a negligence standard in France did not increase
the incidence of pro-plaintiff verdicts by any substantial amount.
186
Moreover, one commentator has suggested that greater control of the jury
can be achieved by careful phrasing of jury instructions and by the use of
special or interrogatory verdicts.8 7 Other traditional means of checking
irresponsible jury behavior are also available to judges, such as judgment
non obstante veredicto.
Commentators disagree over the administrative effects of the adoption
of a negligence standard for land occupier liability cases. It has been argued
that adoption of a negligence standard would stimulate more appeals. 88
Other purported drawbacks in application of the negligence standard may
be illusory. For instance, there is no evidence to substantiate the claim that
adoption of a negligence standard would spur more land occupier liability
cases. 18 9 And there is no reason to fear a greater than usual risk of collusion
in this type of case,, considering the mechanisms available to courts for
guarding against fraud. 90
Despite some administrative and procedural disadvantages to the
application of the negligence standard, there are ways to control the
potential for abuse. In any case, the potential problems are no greater than
184. See, e.g., Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Basso v.
Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 238-39, 352 N.E.2d 868, 870-71, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 (1976)
(jury instructions given by the trial court). Compare James, Functions of Judge and
Jury, supra note 28, at 681 with Bohlen, supra note 166, at 118-19.
185. See James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence
Trials, 5 VAND. L. REV. 697, 704 (1952).
186. Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 684.
187. James, Functions of Judge and Jury, supra note 28, at 679-85.
188. Payne, supra note 35, at 374. Contra, Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra
note 39, at 703-04. Nor is there any evidence that more lawsuits were filed in England
after that country's chang6 to the negligence standard. See McDonald & Leigh, supra
note 35, at 66.
189. Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 702.
190. 25 VAND. L. REV. 623, 637 (1972).
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those for other types of negligence actions. Furthermore, the "opening of the
floodgates" argument that use of the negligence standard will bring
increased litigation seems implausible. The policy advantages of the
substantive changes accomplished through abolition of the common law
standards may outweigh the concern over the possible procedural abuse of
the negligence standard.
Concurring and dissenting opinions in decisions that have abolished the
common law rules have expressed a fear that the negligence standard is so
vague that land occupier liability would be left in a vacuum if the invitee,
licensee, and trespasser categories were discarded.' 9' The ability of the
judiciary to decide confidently this type of case would be hampered,
according to this view, because courts would have to wait until an adequate
number of cases were decided so that new rules could be deduced.
192
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the negligence standard would be
unworkable in the context of land occupier liability, given its viability in
other areas of tort law for many years. In applying negligence theory to a
new area, courts can refer to an existing body of relevant concepts and
policies with which they are already familiar.' 93 Use of the negligence
standard in land occupier liability cases could be analogized to other torts
analyzed on this basis. Although the common law doctrine implicitly
considered certain issues - foreseeability, cost spreading, prevention of
injury - that a negligence standard explicitly evaluates, those questions
were never systematically weighed as they would be under a negligence
standard.' 94 The wider scope of issues considered under the latter theory is
more compatible with the complex range of competing interests in modern
society. 95
CONCLUSION
The common law status system has been challenged by courts and
commentators. Arbitrary and harsh results on one hand and the complexity
of application on the other have led many courts to inquire whether any
justification remains to support continued adherence to these rules. The
common law system has been severely undermined in those jurisdictions
191. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 120, 443 P.2d 561, 569, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 105 (dissenting opinion) (1968); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 247-48, 352
N.E.2d 868, 876-77, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564, 572 (1976) (concurring opinion).
192. See, e.g., Ouellette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 637 (N.H. 1976) (Grimes, J.,
dissenting); Payne, supra note 35, at 362.
193. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564-65,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968); James & Sigerson, supra note 185 at 698-701.
194. See, eg., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117-18, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968). See also Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 701.
195. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 117, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 103 (1968). Cf. Hughes, Duties to Trespassers, supra note 39, at 693 (noting that
under a negligence standard all relevant factors will be considered, allowing judges
and juries to pursue appropriate social policies with some degree of ability to modify
their positions if conditions change).
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that manufacture exceptions because of judicial concern for fairness to
litigants. This suggests that some courts are willing to serve justice at the
expense of strict adherence to the common law categories. Other jurisdic-
tions, like Maryland, attempt to fit diverse cases into strict rules of law.
These defects in the traditional system convinced courts in several
jurisdictions to reject its continued use, adopting the negligence test of
reasonableness in the circumstances. This trend has been based on the
conclusion that favoring unrestricted use of property by a land occupier is
unacceptable if not balanced against societal interests in protecting human
safety. Although the historical bases for the traditional rule have sometimes
been misinterpreted, the abolitionist decisions have relied heavily on the
distinctions between contemporary and nineteenth century social and
economic conditions to show that the reasons for the traditional rules no
longer exist.
The weakness of the historical basis for the common law rules does not
appear to be the most persuasive argument for their abolition. Since few
jurisdictions have not expressed some dissatisfaction with the invitee,
licensee, and trespasser categories, it appears that the real issue is the
propriety of overruling the common law standards. Opinions reflect a basic
disagreement over the strength of stare decisis in a situation where
precedents have minimal rational merit. To those courts that decide
according to the rules of stare decisis only when precedent is independently
persuasive, the negligence standard appears to be theoretically and
practically superior. Despite rhetoric emphasizing the values of predictable
and stable application -of rules of law, those jurisdictions that have adhered
to the common law standards have usually made so many exceptions to the
categories that this argument has little force. Abolition of the common law
rules of status encourages simplified application of rules of law and sound
social policy. It also represents a classic confrontation between liberal and
conservative views on judicial process. In land occupier liability cases, it
appears that the argument favoring the overruling of the common law rules
is overwhelmingly persuasive.
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